The AI development finance “analyst”.

This paper assesses a £2.7M facility request (74% LTGDV, 90% LTC) for 18 flats at Gasworks Lane, Hull. The site holds outline consent only — reserved matters are not approved — and the GDV of £3.65M is speculative: comparable evidence for the proposed product in this location is weak, and on the evidence provided the figure is likely overstated. Profit on cost is ~9% before the planning and delivery risks are priced, against a committee floor of 17–20%.

The deal's single genuine strength is the site's potential: a large plot in a regeneration corridor where a consented, de-risked scheme could work at sensible leverage. That potential is not this application. The sponsor, a first-time developer, has no completed schemes, no delivery team appointed, roughly £300k of equity (10% of cost), and no evidenced capacity to absorb overruns.

The risks are foundational rather than marginal. The former gasworks use makes contamination likely, yet no ground investigation has been commissioned — meaning the single largest cost line is simply unknown, and six-figure remediation would erase the margin entirely. There is no fixed-price contract, no QS cost plan, a 5% contingency against a contaminated brownfield site, and an exit that consists of an assumption that flats will sell, with no agent instructed and no comparable support.

Following rebuttals, the sponsor evidenced a fixed-price contract offer for the build element — a genuine step — but the track-record, margin and exit points were asserted rather than evidenced, and the grade is unchanged. We recommend declining as structured, and re-presenting once: reserved matters are approved, a Phase 2 ground investigation prices the remediation, a RICS valuation supports the GDV, and leverage is reduced to ≤60% LTGDV. The remediation plan below is the roadmap.

The applicant is Gasworks Lane Developments Ltd (Co. No. 15234911), incorporated eight months ago by Mr. Liam Prentice, whose stated background is 'plenty of refurbs' — none evidenced with addresses, dates, costs or outcomes despite request. There are no filed accounts, no delivery team appointed (no architect of record for reserved matters, no QS, no contractor at application), and no monitoring relationship.

Equity of £300k is evidenced in cash. A statement of assets shows little beyond it: a 10% equity layer with no reserve behind it, against a scheme whose largest cost line (remediation) is unquantified. For completeness, the sponsor's energy and local knowledge are apparent from the application — but a credit paper prices evidence, and on evidence this sponsor profile cannot carry a £2.7M facility at 90% of cost.

At rebuttal, a fixed-price offer from a regional contractor was produced for the construction element — the one genuinely evidenced improvement, noted in the construction analysis. It does not extend to the unquantified remediation.

A 1.1-acre freehold former gasworks site with OUTLINE consent for residential development of up to 18 units; reserved matters (scale, appearance, landscaping, layout) are not yet approved, so the scheme that would actually be built has no consent today. The reserved-matters application has not been submitted.

The former use is the defining fact: gasworks sites are among the most reliably contaminated brownfield categories (tars, hydrocarbons, cyanides, asbestos), and no Phase 2 intrusive ground investigation has been carried out. The planning condition attached to the outline explicitly requires a remediation strategy. Until a Phase 2 prices the problem, every appraisal line below the land value is provisional — remediation on comparable gasworks plots has ranged from £150k to £900k+, a swing larger than this scheme's entire projected profit.

Hull's apartment market is shallow: values for the proposed product in this corridor are evidenced only by older re-sales at £160–£175/ft², against the appraisal's implied £203/ft². No new-build comparable within a mile supports the figure; no agent has been instructed; no demand evidence (waiting lists, reservations, letting appraisal) was provided.

The regeneration-corridor narrative has substance over a 5–10 year horizon, but a 24-month facility cannot be repaid from a narrative. On the available evidence the GDV is likely overstated by 10–15%, which at the requested leverage puts the facility itself — not just the profit — at risk: a 10% GDV miss leaves negative equity against the loan.

As submitted: no QS cost plan, no tender, no contractor, and a 5% contingency on a contaminated brownfield site — cost certainty was effectively absent. At rebuttal the sponsor produced a fixed-price offer at £180/ft² from a regional contractor for the construction element, which is a real improvement and is acknowledged as such: it converts the build line from a guess into a priced offer.

The offer explicitly excludes ground remediation, abnormal foundations and service diversions — exactly the categories a gasworks site makes dangerous. Until a Phase 2 investigation defines the below-ground scope, the fixed price covers the knowable half of the cost plan and the unknowable half remains unpriced. Contingency for any re-presentation should be 10% minimum on the build plus a separately quantified remediation budget with its own contingency.

Open-market sales are assumed, with no agent instructed, no pricing strategy, no comparable support and no fallback of any kind modelled. In a shallow market at unevidenced pricing, the exit as presented is an aspiration.

A credible re-presentation would evidence: an agent's letting and sales appraisal, a rental fallback calculation (Hull yields would likely support a partial retain-and-let), and a phased release strategy priced to the RICS valuation rather than to the appraisal's needs.